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Abstract The discussion on the causes of the most recent fertility decline in Europe,
and in particular on the emergence of lowest-low fertility, emphasizes the relevance
of cultural factors in addition to economic ones. As part of such a cultural framework,
the heterogeneity of preferences concerning the ‘‘career vs. family’’ dichotomy has
been systematized in the ‘‘Preference Theory’’ approach developed by Catherine
Hakim. This heterogeneity in preferences, however, has so far been underinvestigated
in a comparative framework. This paper makes use of comparative data from the
2004/2005 Round of the European Social Survey to test the links between individual-
level preferences and both fertility outcomes and fertility intentions, in a variety of
societal settings. Results confirm an association between work–family lifestyle
preferences and realized fertility in a variety of European countries, while they do not
show a relationship between lifestyle preferences and fertility intentions. Results
further support the existence of heterogeneous patterns of association between life-
style preferences and fertility choices among welfare regimes.
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Re´sume´ Le de´bat portant sur les causes de la baisse la plus re´cente de la fe´condite´
en Europe, et en particulier sur l’e´mergence des fe´condite´s les plus basses met
l’accent sur le roˆle des facteurs culturels, par-dela` les facteurs e´conomiques. Dans le
cadre de ces facteurs culturels, l’he´te´roge´ne´ite´ des pre´fe´rences en matie`re de di-
lemme «carrie`re ou famille» a e´te´ formalise´ par Catherine Hakim sous la forme de
la «the´orie des pre´fe´rences». Cette he´te´roge´ne´ite´ des pre´fe´rences a toutefois e´te´ peu
explore´e dans une perspective comparative. Cet article exploite les donne´es com-
paratives de la vague 2004/2005 de l’Enqueˆte Sociale Europe´enne pour tester les
liens entre les pre´fe´rences individuelles, d’une part, et la fe´condite´ re´elle et sou-
haite´e, d’autre part, dans des contextes sociaux tre`s divers. Les re´sultats confirment
une association entre les pre´fe´rences en matie`re de mode de vie par rapport au
travail et a` la famille et la fe´condite´ re´elle dans toute une se´rie de pays europe´ens,
mais ne mettent pas en e´vidence de lien entre les pre´fe´rences en matie`re de mode de
vie et la fe´condite´ souhaite´e. De plus, les re´sultats confirment l’existence de sche´-
mas he´te´roge`nes d’association entre les pre´fe´rences en matie`re de modes de vie et
les choix de fe´condite´ dans les diffe´rents re´gimes d’Etat-providence.
Mots-cle´s The´orie des pre´fe´rences  Fe´condite´s les plus basses 
Europe  Enqueˆte Sociale Europe´enne  Re´gime d’Etat-providence
1 Introduction
The emergence of very low and lowest-low fertility in Europe during the 1990s and
in South-Eastern Asia during the early 2000s has posed several challenges to the
scholars who use international comparison as a way to shed light on the causes of
differences in fertility patterns (see, e.g. Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2003; Kohler
et al. 2002). Moreover, the increasing relevance of low fertility levels in the policy
debate in Europe and elsewhere has triggered the need for a deeper understanding of
the diverse determinants of fertility choices as they might imply different policy
choices (Demeny 2003; Castles 2003; Commission of the European Communities
2005; McDonald 2002; Stark and Kohler 2002). Roughly speaking, contributions
that aim at explaining the causes of very low and lowest-low fertility may be
grouped into two main categories. First, a structural approach, which provides
explanations based on economic factors like rising female education and labour
supply, policy changes and responses to actual and expected unemployment and to
the general economic conditions (see, e.g. Adsera 2005; Ahn and Mira 2002; Butz
and Ward 1979). Second, a cultural approach, centred around the notion of Second
Demographic Transition, which stresses ideational factors like changing values and
attitudes, increased female autonomy and independence as the main driving forces
behind fertility decline (see, e.g. Lesthaeghe 1983; Van de Kaa 1987). Some authors
have emphasized the need to stress simultaneously structural and cultural
determinants (see, e.g. Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; Stark and Kohler 2002).
Nevertheless, so far no comparative study has been conducted with the aim of
weighing the relative importance of the two sets of factors in different European
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countries. To this end, it is necessary to exploit the heterogeneity in fertility
behaviour that exists across countries, and to have access to comparative micro-
level data that contain both structural and cultural variables.
In this paper, we exploit a new source of data, the 2004/2005 Round 2 of the
European Social Survey (ESS-2), in order to conduct a comparative analysis of
fertility choices and intentions for 11 European countries, that we group according
to a well-known classification based on the idea of welfare regimes. Our analysis
starts from Hakim’s (2000) proposal of ‘‘Preference Theory.’’ Preference Theory
gives a central role to the heterogeneity of lifestyle preferences within a population
in the explanation of family and fertility choices, and, in general, choices that affect
the work–family link. More specifically, the paper investigates the link between
women’s lifestyle preferences and fertility outcomes and intentions. Results show
that the classification of women proposed by the Preference Theory is able to
identify three different categories of women according to their work–family lifestyle
preferences in a variety of European countries. Empirical analyses confirm an
association between preferences and actual fertility, while they do not support the
association between preferences and fertility intentions. Results further show the
existence of heterogeneity among welfare regimes for what concerns the relation-
ship between lifestyle preferences and fertility choices. The remainder of the paper
is organized as follows. First, we briefly review Preference Theory and the critical
discussion it has generated in recent sociological and demographic research. We
then describe the ESS-2 data on which our empirical analyses are based and discuss
the links between Preference Theory and the ESS-2 survey instruments. After
providing some descriptive evidence and illustrating our analytical approach, we
present the main results. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks and a general
discussion.
2 Preference Theory and Fertility Choices
Catherine Hakim’s ‘‘Preference Theory’’ (Hakim 2000; see also Hakim 2003a, b) is
a sociological theory which aims to explain the changes that women have
experienced in contemporary societies according to two main lifecycle patterns:
fertility and employment. Preference Theory regards lifestyle preferences and
values as the principal determinants of women’s fertility choices and outcomes, and
it emphasizes the importance of cultural factors as the key factors behind the recent
changes in family and fertility that have occurred in all modern industrialized
societies. Preferences obviously also shape men’s decisions, but ‘‘attitudes have an
especially strong impact on women’s behaviour because women have genuine
choices to make regarding employment versus home-making’’ (Hakim 2002,
p. 432).
An attempt to apply the Theory explicitly to the masculine universe can be
found in Rabusˇic and Manea (2006). According to Hakim, in modern industri-
alized societies women are heterogeneous and this heterogeneity should be
considered explicitly in the explanation of behaviour as well as in the design of
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public policies. More specifically, three different ‘‘types’’ of women are
identifiable in terms of their lifestyle preferences with respect to the trade-off
between family and work. The idea is that, within an industrialized country, the
distribution of women between the three groups is roughly symmetric. At the two
extremes, both accounting for 10–30% of the total, there are, respectively, family-
and career-oriented women, while the great majority, between 40 and 80% of the
total, are defined as ‘‘adaptive women.’’ Preference Theory provides a detailed
description of the three types’ identities.
Being family oriented means regarding family life and children as the main
priorities in life, thus, deciding not to work, at least unless pushed to enter the labour
market by economic need. As some of these women obtain high levels of education,
this can be interpreted as a means to earn a better position on the partnership market
and, more generally, to earn some kind of cultural capital. Being career oriented, on
the other hand, means giving value to a life devoted to work, either in paid
employment or in the public arena. Career-oriented women strive for a high level of
education, and they stay frequently unmarried and/or childless. Finally, adaptive
women have no prevailing preference orientation. They usually want to get the best
of both worlds, combining work and family. Adaptive women are therefore in the
very centre of the trade-off between family and work career. The group of adaptive
women usually also includes women with an unplanned future, who aim at grasping
career or family opportunities when either one of the two shows up, or when public
policies change in favour of one extreme group or the other. Women in this group
usually achieve education and qualifications as an insurance policy and usually quit
working or move to part time work after a birth. This is the category that researchers
usually refer to when they consider women in a given society as belonging to a
homogeneous group.
According to Preference Theory, the three lifestyle orientations originate within a
new scenario that results from five historical changes: the contraceptive revolution,
the equal opportunities revolution, the expansion of white-collar occupations, the
creation of jobs for secondary earners and, finally, the increasing importance of
personal values and preferences when individual choices are made. In other words,
the emergence of this new scenario can be interpreted in terms of the Second
Demographic Transition, as outlined by Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa in a series of
contributions, with the difference that Hakim puts a specific emphasis on the
resulting within-society heterogeneity of preferences rather than on the common-
ality of trends.
Hakim points out that not all modern societies have achieved the new scenario
yet1 and that the relative size of the three groups of women could vary in those
countries where public policies favour one group or another. In her view, on their
1 ‘‘The US, Britain and probably the Netherlands currently provide the prime examples of societies that
have achieved the new scenario for women. […] Most European countries still have little or nothing to
actively enforce equal opportunities legislation. […] For example, in Greece, Italy and Spain, there is
evidence of informal barriers to women’s access to the labour market: female unemployment rates are
more than double those of males […]. Within the European Union, only Britain, Ireland, and the
Netherlands have a public body responsible for enforcing equal pay and equal opportunities laws’’
(Hakim 2003b, p. 360).
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own, preferences ‘‘have a strong impact on behaviour: on employment rates, hours
worked, fertility, and patterns of marriage and divorce’’ (Hakim 2003c, p. 342).
Moreover, contextual social, structural and institutional factors influence different
groups of women in different ways: adaptive women are very responsive to any kind
of public policies and to institutional factors generally, but the other two extreme
groups are influenced only by factors affecting their inner preference orientation, i.e.
family-oriented women are not responsive to employment policies while career-
oriented women are not responsive to social family ones.
According to Hakim, within the European environment, Britain seems to be a
special case where the labour market, the legal system and the background
acceptance of differences in values and cultures have all contributed to the
emergence of the new scenario for women. Moreover, Britain can be regarded as
the most suitable background for testing Preference Theory also because, given the
limited scope of welfare policies, the Government’s intervention in the private
sphere acts without biasing individual decisions. Indeed, Hakim provides evidence
that her classification fits the British case quite well, and that it also fits actual
fertility in Britain: family- and work-centred women turn out to be, respectively, the
most and the least fertile.
Hakim’s Preference Theory has attracted a great deal of interest in the literature,
including critical views. The main critiques concern the causality link, i.e. whether
heterogeneous preferences are actually causing heterogeneous behaviour. Instead,
Hakim’s critics suggest that the causality link goes in the opposite direction, i.e.,
generally, person-specific circumstances and background factors mostly account for
a person’s orientation in life and thus determine decisions, while preferences do not
causally explain behaviour, but just shape and influence choices (Crompton and
Harris 1998; Fagan 2001; Procter and Padfield 1999; Rose 2001). It is well known
from the literature that actual fertility might trigger changes in values and
preferences (see, e.g. Beets et al. 1999). In other words, family-oriented women
might not tend to become more frequently married with children; it might be that the
circumstance of being mothers with children causes preferences to be oriented
toward a family-centred lifestyle. In this respect, McRae’s critique (2003a, b)
underlines that Preference Theory does not sufficiently take into account the fact
that situational, structural and normative constraints might bias women’s choices,
lifestyle preferences being susceptible to change over the life course. The same
concept has been outlined by Tomlinson (2006), who observes that care networks,
work status and the welfare policy context are three powerful forces which can
either facilitate or impede the realization of every woman’s work preferences,
driving female trajectories toward and away from part-time work following
maternity. Doorewaard et al. (2004), focusing on a sub-sample of female returners2
and analyzing women’s orientations toward work—i.e. different reasons driving
women’s (re)entrance in the labour market—demonstrate a strong association
between personal, financial and family constraints and women’s work orientations.
2 The expression ‘‘female returners’’ refers to ‘‘women who seek to re-enter the work-force after a few
years of unpaid care-taking responsibilities’’ (Doorewaard et al. 2004, p. 8).
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Others discussed whether the heterogeneity in preferences could be broader than the
three categories proposed by Hakim (Aassve et al. 2007; Tomlinson 2006).
In what follows, we attempt to build a categorization of women that comes as
close as possible to the one outlined by Hakim, and we investigate whether three
different types of women are identifiable when extending the analysis to European
countries other than Great Britain. Subsequently, we test whether actual and
intended fertilities are different across these three groups as suggested by the
Preference Theory.
3 Comparative Survey Data and the Classification of Women According
to Work–Family Preferences
Our empirical analyses are based on the European Social Survey Round 2 2004/
2005, second edition (ESS-2 from now onwards).3 The ESS is a biennial social
survey that generally aims at measuring values and behaviours of European
populations and at understanding how and why such patterns can vary over time.
The questionnaire for each round consists of a core module, constant from round to
round, plus rotating modules, repeated at intervals and each time devoted to
different topics. The core module aims at monitoring change and continuity in
socio-economic–political and demographic variables, and at providing background
variables for the analysis of the rotating modules, whose purpose is to investigate in
depth some particular themes. The European Social Survey proves to be useful for
our analysis of lifestyle preferences since, within the second round (ESS-2), it
contains a rotating module collecting information on family, work and well-being.
Therefore, specific questions about family–work balance are asked, as well as
general questions on family and fertility choices. Particular care has been taken in
developing the international comparability of the ESS. More specifically, the data
are collected through a cross-sectional survey, conducted through face-to-face
interviews in national languages with a strict methodology and with careful
translation of questionnaires that ensures the comparability of national samples.
ESS-2 allows us to design a classification of women that reproduces the one
developed by Hakim, by looking at their expressed preferences about the
combination of family and work, instead of distinguishing women according to
observable variables, such as, for example, the first time mothers’ work history
proposed by McRae (2003a). In the latter case, in fact, behaviour is used to predict
preferences, and not, as Preference Theory suggests, the other way round. However,
our cross-sectional data do not allow us to discriminate between the two causality
directions. Hakim’s original classification of women into the three groups, namely
family-oriented, career-oriented and adaptive, was based on three survey questions.
She referred to the 1999 British Survey, a project carried out for an Economic and
Social Research Council Programme on the Future of Work, and developed with the
3 Edition 2.0, with data released on 8 March 2006. The original dataset includes all countries for which
data have been deposited before 1 June 2005: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovakia, Ukraine.
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precise purpose of testing Preference Theory. Using a question on ideal family
models, Hakim identifies home-centred women as those preferring complete role
segregation within marriage, with the man as the breadwinner.4 Career-oriented
women are identified by combining their preference for the egalitarian family model
with other two questions. First, Hakim uses an indicator of work commitment: the
statement that one will continue with paid work in the absence of economic need.5
Then, she combines the previous information with the status of being a primary
earner, i.e. the sole or joint main earner in the household.6 Adaptive women are
defined as the residual category. The present classification is that presented by
Hakim (2002, p. 442). In subsequent articles (see, for example, Hakim 2003b,
p. 362), however, she omits the reference to the choice of a particular family model
when identifying career-oriented women.
Within the ESS-2 (which was not explicitly designed to conform to Hakim’s
categorization), we use a set of three questions to build a classification of women’s
lifestyle preferences. More specifically, we use a question about the male versus
female eligibility to enter the labour market when jobs are scarce, and code as
family oriented those women agreeing or strongly agreeing with the following
statement ‘‘When jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women.’’
In this way, we identify women supporting a traditional view of the family with
clear division of gender roles. For the identification of career-oriented women, we
rely on two questions. First, we code as ‘‘committed to work’’ those women who
disagree or strongly disagree with the following statement: ‘‘A woman should be
prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family.’’ The question on
work commitment identifies women with a manifest job prioritization, for whom
‘‘family life is fitted around their work’’ (Hakim 2003a, p. 357). Then, following
Hakim, we use a question asking the proportion of the household income provided
by the respondent, and code as primary earners those answering that they provide
from about half to all of their household income. Combining the previous
information, we define the work-centred group. The inclusion of the income
variable as an indicator for identifying career-oriented women needs to be read in
terms of adoption of ‘‘a primary earner identity’’ (for a more detailed explanation,
see Hakim 2003b, p. 363). Women who do not have a partner and thus are more
often primary earners, are not automatically classified as work oriented, the latter
4 The survey question used is the following: ‘‘People talk about the changing roles of husband and wife in
the family. Here are three kinds of family. Which of them corresponds best with your ideas about the
family?
– A family where the two partners each have an equally demanding job and where housework and the
care of the children are shared equally between them.
– A family where the wife has a less demanding job than her husband and where she does the larger
share of housework and caring for the children.
– A family where only the husband has a job and the wife runs the home.
– None of these three cases.’’
5 The survey question used is the following: ‘‘If without having to work you had what you would regard
as a reasonable living income, would you still prefer to have a paid job, or wouldn’t you bother?’’
6 The survey question used is the following: ‘‘Who is the main income-earner in your household? Is it
yourself? Your partner/spouse? Both of you jointly? Or someone else?’’
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category being defined via a combination of the information on income and work
commitment. We classify other respondents as adaptive.7
Two of the three questions involved in our classification concern attitudes about
gender roles on family and market work. Their use for this purpose could thus be
criticized (see Hakim 2003c), because preferences may be not properly captured
when general beliefs and approvals are asked as indicators of personal goals and
attitudes. Nonetheless, this study demonstrates an association between the
orientations expressed when answering these questions—although they could be
driven by public morality suggestions—and a series of observable characteristics in
a woman’s family and working life.
Our classification of preferences seems indeed to closely replicate Hakim’s
classification for Britain. In fact, 2004 ESS-2-based results for Britain—obtained by
considering the same sample restrictions as Hakim (2003b)—are very similar to the
one based on the 1999 British survey developed by Hakim (Table 1).
4 The Comparative Setting and Descriptive Evidence
Our comparative analyses focus on Western Europe only. In order to grasp the link
between preferences and behaviour as mediated by the policy environment, we refer
to the widely used ‘‘three worlds’’ classification of Western European countries
according to their welfare regimes, originally developed by Esping-Andersen
(1990). As is commonly done, this typology is modified to create a specific fourth
group for Southern European countries (see, among others, Ferrera 1998; Ferrera
et al. 2000; Esping-Andersen et al. 2002 and Gauthier 2002). More specifically, we
use data from the following 11 European countries: Austria, Germany, Switzerland,
Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. We
thus make use of four groups of countries:
Table 1 Classification of women according to work–family preferences: a comparison of frequencies
using the 2004 ESS-2 for Britain and Hakim’s (2003b) 1999 ESRCa survey (column percentages)
ESS-2, 2004 ESRC, 1999
Family-oriented 16 14
Adaptive 68 70
Career-oriented 16 16
No. of cases 601 1,235
Note: For a better comparison with Hakim’s result, we replicate her sample restrictions referring to
women aged 20–59 years, having completed their full-time education
a Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Research Programme on the Future of Work, running
over 1998–2003 in Britain
7 Forty respondents were classified both as family-oriented and as career-oriented. Actually, the
questions used for classifying women are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, all the three questions used
are opinion questions, so the answers could be driven by social norms rather than by the respondents’
subjective ideals. For instance, while men usually define themselves as primary earners even when they
are actually not, women sometimes answer in the opposite direction––cf. Hakim (2003b, p. 363) for a
similar argument. For the remainder of this analysis, these cases will be excluded.
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– Liberal Welfare Countries, i.e. Great Britain and Ireland. Such countries offer
relatively low welfare coverage and focus primarily on cases of poverty and
need, with eligibility also verified through means testing. This system thus relies
on the market as the main provider of welfare services, besides the family—for
this reason Hakim considers this regime not to bias individual choices within
Preference Theory.
– Social Democratic Welfare Countries, i.e. Sweden, Denmark and Norway.
These countries are characterized by a universalistic regime that aims at
promoting equality between individuals in general and between women and men
in particular. This regime offers social services and benefits to all its citizens, as
well as specific rights related to employment. When compared to other welfare
regimes, this regime has the highest proportion of public expenditure devoted to
welfare. The State is therefore the main provider of welfare services.
– Conservative Welfare Countries, i.e. Austria, Germany and Switzerland. These
continental countries provide an ‘‘intermediate’’ level of welfare, differentiated
with respect to marital status or to the years of contribution to the social security
system and frequently linking welfare benefits provision to working status. In
this regime, the family is seen as the main welfare provider and the family idea
is in line with the traditional gender division of tasks and the ‘‘male
breadwinner’’ model.
– Southern European (Familialistic) welfare countries, i.e. Spain, Portugal and
Greece. In these countries, welfare relies both on public and private services and
provides a very fragmented set of policies usually dependent on the individual’s
working status. These countries share similarities with the Conservative cluster
(and for this reason they are grouped together in the original ‘‘three worlds’’
classification by Esping-Andersen), but for Southern European countries, the
role of the family as the principal welfare provider is even more relevant. We
know that lowest-low fertility emerged during the 1990s in this cluster (Kohler
et al. 2002).8
We restrict our analyses to the ESS-2 sub-sample of female respondents aged 45
years or less. For these women, the information on short-term fertility plans is
available; this allows us to use the same sample for analyzing both actual and
intended fertility.9 The final sample includes 5,529 female respondents for 11
countries. In the remaining part of the section, we discuss some descriptive results.
According to Hakim’s classification, the percentage of home- and work-centred
groups should vary between 10 and 30%, while adaptive women are in the range of
40–80%. By applying the ESS-2-based classification to all 11 European countries
considered in the analysis, we find a distribution that lies, on average, within the
bounds suggested by Hakim (Table 2).
8 Unfortunately, we could not consider Italy in this study, since Italian data were not comparable with
other ESS-2 data.
9 The question on fertility intentions is asked only to women aged 45 years or less. We also exclude from
our analyses observations for which the relationship of the respondent with other household members is
missing, when the respondent is not the only person in the household.
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At the country level the distribution of women’s preferences lies outside the
predicted range or is very close to its bounds. These ‘‘deviations’’ can be considered
as consistent with Preference Theory, since they support Hakim’s hypothesis that in
some countries public policies might trigger the distribution of preferences towards
giving more weight to a specific group. Indeed, this seems to be the case in all
countries belonging to the ‘‘Social Democratic’’ and to the ‘‘Southern European’’
welfare regimes. In the first group, the percentage of career-oriented women is the
highest, accounting for 26–38% of all women in the sample. At the same time, the
proportion of family-oriented women in countries belonging to the ‘‘Social
Democratic’’ welfare regime is the smallest and it lies below the lower bound of
10%, as suggested by the Theory. Hakim suggests that Sweden lacks genuine
choices because of the slowdown of two of the five structural changes that have
occurred in all modern societies: the creation of jobs for secondary earners and the
importance of values and attitudes (Hakim 2002) and, more generally, because of
Swedish fiscal and social policies (Hakim 2008). Indeed, it is easy to conclude that
all countries of the Social Democratic regime share public policies aiming at
favouring women’s entrance in the labour market in a context of gender equality,
which has facilitated and supported the combination of childrearing and labour
market participation. Social norms and values have furthermore fostered the
establishment and acceptance of those policies.
The proportion of family-oriented women in the three Southern European
countries is concentrated on the upper bound, varying between 21 and 28%. In this
Table 2 Classification of women according to work–family preferences using the ESS-2 (row
percentages)
Family-oriented Adaptive Career-oriented No. of cases
Liberal
Britain 12 71 17 472
Ireland 13 76 11 525
Social Democratic
Denmark 3 59 38 370
Sweden 2 65 33 442
Norway 4 70 26 417
Conservative
Germany 12 72 16 675
Austria 10 76 14 617
Switzerland 12 78 10 534
Southern European
Greece 28 57 15 571
Spain 21 66 13 400
Portugal 27 63 10 506
Whole sample 14 69 17 5,529
Note: Within each regime, countries have been ordered with respect to the proportion of work-oriented
women in a descending order
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case, the size of the work-oriented group shows no difference with respect to other
European countries: it is the percentage of adaptive women that is reduced.
According to Preference Theory, the idea is that labour market conditions and social
norms have contributed to slowdown historical changes: what matters here is the
presence of ‘‘informal barriers to women’s access to the labour market’’ (Hakim
2000, p. 455) and the slow change in values and attitudes. Indeed, in Southern
European countries, women’s lifestyle choices are still closely shaped by tradition,
social habits and mental architectures embedded in culture and in daily life, see, e.g.
the ‘‘strong family’’ tradition (Reher 1998). Overcoming these family-oriented
constraints might take more time with respect to other European countries.
To sum up, Hakim’s classification is consistent with the peculiarities of Social
Democratic and Southern European countries as discussed in the literature on
welfare regimes. However, no specific difference can be discerned between the
preference distribution in the Liberal and in the Conservative countries.
From a descriptive point of view, the classification by Hakim seems to clearly
identify three distinct groups of women, who differ with respect to several items
(see Table 3). The proportion of women employed in paid work is the highest
within the work-oriented group (81%), while only less than half of the women
classified as family-oriented are working (46%). Adaptive women are in between.
At the individual country level, in some cases, this rank does not hold: in Denmark
the same percentage is observed for both career- and family-oriented women, while
in Norway and in Switzerland the percentage of family-oriented women who are
currently employed is (slightly) higher than that of adaptive women. In this regard,
beside the above-mentioned ease of female entrance into the labour force
experienced by these countries, it is necessary to consider the fact, documented
also by Hakim, that sometimes women enter the labour market because of financial
needs, even against their preferences. When considering the mean number of years
of completed full time education, career-oriented women study, on average, 1 year
more than adaptive women and 3 years more than family-oriented women. The
differences are not too pronounced, however, confirming Hakim’s idea that the three
divergent lifestyle preferences can be found at all educational levels and in all social
classes.
The great majority of family-oriented women are married or cohabiting (69%
within the whole sample), while only half of work-oriented women are currently
living with a partner (50%). Again, the adaptive group is in between. Again,
Denmark departs from the general average behaviour, since no clear difference
between the three groups can be discerned. On average, a majority of family-
oriented women (62%) engage in housework for more than half of the total
household time devoted to this activity; this proportion gradually decreases when
considering adaptive (48%) and work-oriented women (32%). At the individual
country level, only Denmark departs from the expected relationship. Finally, the
percentage of family-oriented women claiming they improved their knowledge or
their skills in the last year only accounts for a share of 23%, on average. The same
percentage increases by 20 points percent when considering adaptive women and
reaches 58% when considering career-oriented women.
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5 Lifestyle Preferences and Fertility: Hypotheses and Methods
We have shown that the classification of women according to lifestyle preferences
shows consistent patterns of association with behaviour and is associated with
welfare regimes. Now we turn to our main research question: can Preference Theory
help explain differences in actual and intended fertility? To give a positive answer
to such a question, we would expect family-oriented women to have the largest
family size and/or to be the most willing to have a(nother) birth, since, by definition,
they choose family life and children as their main priority. On the other hand, we
would expect career oriented to be the least fertile, as Preference Theory predicts
childless women to be concentrated within this group, and the least willing to have
a(nother) child, since, by definition, this group centres its life on working activities.
Adaptive women should lie in between.
To test whether Hakim’s classification is associated with actual and intended
fertility, we perform multivariate regression analyses. In order to study the
association with actual fertility, we estimate, separately for each country, an ordered
logistic model where the dependent variable is the number of children ever had
(0, 1, 2, 3?, with retrospective reporting). All respondents for whom the
information on children ever had is missing are excluded from our analyses.
Whenever this model turns out to violate the parallel regression assumption (i.e. that
the effect is not parity-specific), we apply a generalized ordinal logistic model (with
parity-specific effects). In a first set of models (labelled as Model 1), we only
include Hakim’s classification of women as an explanatory variable. In all models,
adaptive women constitute the reference category. In a second set of models (Model
2), we add further explanatory variables: age, educational level (i.e. number of years
of full-time education completed, centred around the individual country mean, thus
controlling for country-specific educational systems), work status, educational
enrolment and partnership status.
To study the association with intended fertility, we estimate a logistic regression
model that models the probability that the respondent intends to have a child within
the next 3 years (vs. not intending to have a child).10 The exact question used in the
survey is: ‘‘Do you plan to have a child within the next 3 years?’’ Respondents could
choose between four answers: ‘‘definitely not,’’ ‘‘probably not,’’ ‘‘probably yes’’ and
‘‘definitely yes,’’ or they could refuse to answer, or simply answer that they did not
know. All respondents, for whom the information on fertility intentions is missing,
are excluded from our analyses. We collapse the answers into two categories: the
intention not to have a child within the next 3 years encompasses the answers
‘‘definitely not’’ and ‘‘probably not,’’ while the remaining two answers, ‘‘probably
yes’’ and ‘‘definitely yes’’ are collapsed into a second category indicating the
intention to have a child within the next 3 years. In a first set of models (Model 1),
fertility intentions are studied as a function of lifestyle preferences, while
controlling for parity (we distinguish between childless women, women with one
child (reference category), and women who already had two or more births). In a
10 A closer correspondence between fertility intentions and behaviours may be achieved when intentions
refer to an explicit time interval (Miller and Pasta 1995).
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second set of models (Model 2), we add the set of covariates that we also include in
the models for actual fertility. In all regressions, we apply weights that are inverse to
the probability of being included in the sample.
6 Lifestyle Preferences and Fertility: Results
6.1 Lifestyle Preferences and Actual Fertility
The following results have to be interpreted carefully, in terms of association
between lifestyle preferences and actual fertility, rather than in terms of a causal
relationship from preferences to actual fertility. If the association patterns were
consistent with Preference Theory, we should be able to find the ‘‘footprints’’ of
lifestyle preferences on actual fertility, using the term of Surkyn and Lesthaeghe
(2004). Descriptive results are shown in Table 4. According to the Preference
Theory, childlessness should be, on average, higher in the group of career-oriented
women as compared to the family-oriented women and, to a smaller extent, also to
adaptive women. Indeed, the proportion of childless belonging to the work-oriented
group is more than 10% higher than that belonging to the family-oriented group.
However, our data suggest that there is no relevant difference in the proportion of
childlessness between adaptive and work-oriented women: respectively 47 and 48%
of respondents turn out to be childless. Similarly, women with one child represent
19 and 21% for adaptive and family-oriented categories, respectively, while the
proportion is slightly higher in the career-oriented group (23%). Lifestyle
preferences are more closely associated with higher parities. The proportion of
women with ‘‘large’’ families, i.e. three or more children, is higher among family
oriented as compared to the other two types: 16 against 11% among the adaptive
group, and only 8% among the careerists.
Tables 5 and 6 show the estimates from the ordered logit models, where the
response variable is the actual number of children. Table 5 refers to the countries
where the ordered logit model is applied, while Table 6 gives the estimates of
generalized ordered logit models used for the countries where the hypothesis of
proportional regressions turns out to be violated (i.e. covariates have a parity-
specific effect).11
In Model 1, being family oriented is almost always positively associated with
actual family size. The only exceptions are Ireland, where both work and family
orientations are positively associated with actual fertility, Sweden and Denmark,
where the association with preferences, although consistent with the ‘‘footprints’’ of
Preference Theory, is not statistically significant. Great Britain is the only country
11 We found that the parallel regression assumption is not violated if the ordered logit models are run on
the sub-sample of women with at least one child, thus suggesting that passing from parity zero to parity
one is very different from experiencing other transitions, as shown in other studies (Testa and Grilli
2006). However, this solution implies a considerable reduction of the sample size and excludes from the
analysis a significant proportion of work-oriented women who, according to Preference Theory, are
frequently childless. We therefore decided to estimate generalized ordered models, which do not impose
the constraints of parallel regression.
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for which the hypothesis of parallel regression is violated, and the negative
association between being career oriented and actual family size is significant only
for higher parities, i.e. two or more children.
In the second set of models (Model 2), the association between lifestyle
preferences and actual fertility is consistent with Preference Theory in Norway,
Austria and Germany. However, the parameters of the model are statistically
significant only for family-oriented women in Norway and for career-oriented
women in Germany. In the other countries, parameter estimates run in a direction
that is (even) opposite to that expected from Preference Theory, but they do not
significantly differ from zero. Results consistent with Hakim’s theory are found in
Great Britain, Sweden and Germany. In this latter group of countries, career-
oriented women are significantly less likely to have large families than the adaptive
group. Results are consistent with Preference Theory also for Norway, Portugal and
Switzerland, where family-oriented women are more likely to have families with
many children.
These results reveal that in some European countries lifestyle preferences are
significantly associated with actual fertility, while in some other countries they are
not. Moreover, the association between preferences and actual fertility does not
reflect the classification of countries according to the welfare regime typology. In
many cases, the significant main effect of lifestyle preferences disappears once other
socio-demographic covariates are taken into account, suggesting that lifestyle
preferences do not contain additional information with respect to other variables that
measure ‘‘structural’’ socio-demographic factors, or that the effect of lifestyle
preferences is mediated by other life-course choices. Additional variables, like
union status, educational attainment, employment status or educational enrolment,
are all consistently associated with actual fertility.
6.2 Lifestyle Preferences and Intended Fertility
As fertility intentions can be considered a prerequisite for fertility behaviour, we
would expect lifestyle preferences to have an effect on intended fertility if a link
existed between preferences and behaviour. We therefore consider the test of
Preference Theory on fertility intention as more stringent than the one on actual
fertility. Table 7 shows the proportions of different women, as classified according
to lifestyle preferences, intending to have a child within the next 3 years.
Interestingly, only in Great Britain are family-oriented respondents more often
intending to have a child in the near future, as compared to women with different
lifestyle preferences in the same country (see the first column within each preference
group in Table 7). In contrast to what one would expect according to Preference
Theory, in all the other countries considered we find a higher proportion of career-
oriented women who have short-term fertility plans, as compared to the other two
groups (adaptive and family oriented). This finding should be taken with some caution
due to the selection process that may cause career-oriented women to postpone their
actual childbearing more often than the other women. The postponement of actual
childbearing would explain why there is a larger group within the career-oriented
women—that are also on average at lower parities—wanting a child. Indeed, when we
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analyze childless women and women with at least one child separately, we get results
that are more consistent with the Preference Theory: family-oriented women are more
likely to plan a child than career-oriented women (see the second and third columns
within each preference group in Table 7).
Descriptive data suggest the existence of a large variation in short-term fertility
intentions among countries belonging to the same welfare regime while they do not
show relevant within-country differences between the three groups of women. The
only remarkable exception is Great Britain, the country in which childless career-
oriented women seem to be less likely to intend to have a child within the next 3
years. For a more careful analysis, multivariate regressions are needed. When we
look at estimates from the logit model (Table 8), we get a similar picture.
Covariates related to lifestyle preferences are not statistically significant either in
the models that control for parity only (Model 1), or in models that control for
several socio-demographic factors (Model 2). The only relevant exceptions are
Denmark and Great Britain. In the Danish case, family-oriented women are more
likely to intend to have a(n additional) child within the next 3 years, while the
British career-oriented women are less likely to intend to have a child within the
Table 7 Distribution of women with different lifestyle preferences and positive short-term fertility
intentions
Family-oriented Adaptive Career-oriented All No. of cases
All 0 1? All 0 1? All 0 1? All 0 1?
Liberal
Britain 21 40 11 20 33 14 15 17 14 20 30 14 472
Ireland 13 9 15 17 16 19 27 45 16 18 18 18 525
Social democratic
Denmark 23 33 14 22 30 17 29 46 16 25 36 16 370
Sweden 27 40 17 25 27 22 28 36 21 26 30 22 442
Norway 12 0 17 28 32 26 27 38 19 27 33 24 417
Conservative
Germany 11 18 8 14 20 9 20 27 13 15 21 10 675
Austria 17 5 23 18 23 13 18 27 8 18 23 14 617
Switzerland 18 37 9 28 33 23 23 33 17 27 33 21 534
Southern European
Greece 30 55 18 20 22 18 33 51 19 25 33 18 571
Spain 25 24 25 23 26 19 34 45 18 25 29 21 400
Portugal 18 16 19 22 31 13 26 30 23 21 27 16 506
Whole sample 20 27 17 21 26 17 26 36 17 22 28 17 5,529
Note: The table reports the percentages of women expressing positive fertility intentions. The first column
(All) within each preference group refers to women at all parities, the second column (0) refers to women
at parity zero while the third column (1?) refers to women at parity one or more. Women with positive
fertility intentions are those answering ‘‘probably yes’’ or ‘‘definitely yes’’ to the survey question on the
intention to have a child within the next 3 years. Sample sizes may be smaller than those presented in
Table 4 because of missing values
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next 3 years, once the effect of background variables is controlled for.12 It is worth
noting that in Denmark, unlike Britain, the percentage of women with positive
fertility intentions shows no significant differences across the three groups of
women (Table 7). In the same way, the percentage of Danish women at different
parities shows no significant differences across the three groups (Table 4);
moreover, Denmark departs also from the identification of the three divergent
types of women according to a variety of external characteristics (Table 3). For this
reason, the case of Denmark cannot be considered as consistent with Preference
Theory. For what concerns the other countries, some results are even inconsistent
with the Theory: for example, in Greece work-oriented women are more likely to
plan a child in the near future.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied the Preference Theory approach proposed by Catherine
Hakim focusing on Western European countries. We have provided some evidence
that Hakim’s Preference Theory is able to identify three different categories of
women with respect to their lifestyle preferences toward family or work in a variety
of European societies. Moreover, we showed that heterogeneity in lifestyle
preferences is mirrored differently in different societies and in different welfare
state regimes. Our results of both Social Democratic and Southern European
countries also demonstrate that welfare states may bias feminine preference
orientations, as suggested by the Preference Theory approach.
We have documented an association between women’s lifestyle preferences as
described by Hakim’s Preference Theory and actual fertility in many of the
European settings considered in the analysis. Family-oriented women are the most
fertile, while work-oriented women are the least fertile if compared to other women
in the sample, even though, after controlling for other background variables, the
effect of lifestyle preferences on achieved fertility is, in some cases, absorbed by
other factors. If we consider that the relative size of the three female groups varies
greatly across countries, this last result seems to suggest that the country-specific
compositional effect might explain some variation in the actual fertility levels
across countries.
When we evaluated the importance of the same categorization in the fertility
decision-making process, through an analysis of the determinants of fertility
intentions, results do not support the view that lifestyle preferences explain current
fertility choices in the European setting, with the exception of Britain and Denmark.
The positive relationship found in the Danish sample between preferences toward
the family and short-term fertility plans could, however, be misleading since
12 This negative effect of being career oriented on fertility intentions in Britain becomes even higher if
we run the same set of models only on the sub-sample of women living in a union, who—according to
Hakim—should also have more clear life preferences. In other words, among married or cohabiting
women, the consistency of the Preference Theory increases in the case of Britain, while the effect is lost
in the case of Denmark. Results for these models are not shown because of the considerable reduction of
the sample size they involve.
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Denmark does not support the existence of any association between preferences and
actual fertility, employment status and cohabitation status.
Thus, Great Britain, the country regarded by Hakim as the most suitable
environment to test the Theory on the basis of the achievement of the new scenario
for women and the provision of neutral public polices, behaves differently from any
other country involved in this study. A general reason why we do not find an
association between lifestyle preferences and intended fertility might be the
selection process: childlessness is very frequent among career-oriented women and
these women are also the most willing to have a(n additional) birth in the near
future. This suggests that career-oriented women could have short-term fertility
plans because they have not had a child yet, as a result of consequent
postponements, more frequent for them than for family-oriented women, who,
instead, may not intend to have a birth in the short term, since they already have
children, and maybe they have already reached their ideal family size.
Another possible explanation of our results is that lifestyle preferences are more
influenced by actual fertility than vice versa. Work–family preferences could be the
result and not the cause of fertility. In this case, it would be consistent to only find a
relation between lifestyle preferences and realized fertility—this would explain the
difference between the results on actual and intended fertility. To fully test this
hypothesis, we would need longitudinal data in order to identify the formation of
lifestyle preferences during the life course, and in particular possibly as a
consequence of fertility choices.
Finally, we have documented the existence of strong heterogeneity among
welfare regimes in terms of the relationship between work–family lifestyle
preferences and both actual and intended fertility. In all regimes, it is possible to
find countries where either family-oriented women are more likely to achieve higher
parities if compared to adaptive women or work-oriented women are more likely to
achieve lower parities, while there are countries belonging to different welfare
regimes where heterogeneous preference orientations are not associated with
heterogeneous fertility behaviours. This finding suggests the relevance of country-
specific differences in the association patterns between lifestyle preferences and
fertility which go beyond the existing similarities among welfare regimes.
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